Spain / 6 Min Read

Non-State Political Actors in Fisheries: The Strategic Synergies to Push for Policy Change

Fighting for Small-Scale Fishermen's Rights in the Canary Islands

Karina M. Higa

Marine Ethnobiologist

Karina M. Higa

Marine Ethnobiologist

Introduction

Powerful synergies between fisher folk and third-party advocates can change the trajectory of history. Such was the case for the fishing community in the Canary Islands, which fought to change public policy on fishing quotas for bluefin tuna. Fishers often struggle with administrative skills and technical language surrounding legislation, making participation in politics and fisheries management a barrier. This is where non-fish organizations can come in, helping to represent and advance fishermen’s rights.

Historically, bluefin tuna is a valuable livelihood for Canary Island communities. Faced with an unequal distribution of fishing quotas for the species, which essentially blocked small-scale fishers from being able to make an adequate livelihood from their fishing activities, the local fishing community partnered with LIFE, a lobbying company that represents the fishermen’s interest in policy-making to challenge the government issued quota in court. The collaborative effort worked to increase the visibility and voice of the Canary Islanders, resulting in a change of national regulation and victory for small-scale fisheries.

Non-State Political Actors in Fisheries: The Strategic Synergies to Push for Policy Change

The fisheries industry perpetuates inequalities due to the current capitalist socio-economic system that squeezes out small-scale fishermen to the edge of society, leading to a lack of natural resource access, human rights, and food sovereignty. Fishery policies with consistent and consolidated regulations towards the fisheries industry reflect benefits leaving small-scale fisheries (SSF) to create new strategies to assert their voices in decision-making processes. As the market regulates trade and access, fishery policies can be a way to cope with inequalities in the small-scale fishery sector. This way, fishermen work synergistically with local organizations, NGOs, and lobbying companies to represent the sector in the political realm.

Challenges in Political Representation

These alliances seek to counteract fishermen’s low representativeness in politics, as their lack of cultural capital (administrative, writing, and verbal communication skills) and understanding of the technical terms used to regulate the fisheries policies are barriers to participate in policy-making. In this context, non-fish representatives have gained space as facilitators in the decision-making process by influencing agenda setting, moderating in negotiation and mobilization of funds and support as influential members of the Advisory Council. Therefore, non-state actors are essential to the political changes regarding fishermen’s rights.

One example of inequalities small-scale fisheries face is the quota system, where the government limits natural resource access. The status of stocks is used to calculate the maximum sustainable yield. According to the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), the legal criteria for the quota’s distribution considers the “impact of fishing on the environment, the history of compliance, the contribution to the local economy and historic catch levels.” This criteria clearly states the small-scale fishers’ right to contribute to the local economy, as it has a strong relationship with the community and the environment.

Case Study: Bluefin Tuna Management in Spain

In Spain, the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) management system of bluefin tuna regulated by the State allocates the catch share system unequally. Historically, bluefin tuna fishing is a valuable livelihood for Canary Island Communities; the SSF was responsible for 16% of Spain’s total catch in 1965 and 1980 before the industrial fisheries took over the activity. The Islanders had the historical and legal rights to resource access. However, the distribution of the bluefin tuna quotas positioned the ‘recent’ historical catch records of 2008 in which the industrial fishers (bait boats, purse seine large-scale fleet, and tuna traps) were more active than SSF (hook-and-line fleet). Therefore, leaving only the contingency catch to the SSF, a bycatch quota along with other types of tuna species, 2.5% of the percentage between 2008 and 2015.

An ITQ (Individual transferable quota) system allows fishers to sell or lease their quota to another fisherman or a fishing enterprise, creating a competitive quota market. Large-scale industrial fishing corporations, whose economic power benefits from the quota market competition, allow fishers to sell or lease their quotas (ITQs) to the enterprises, resulting in few quotas left to small-scale fishers.

As the bluefin tuna is an essential species and a valuable livelihood for the islander, the increase of the TAC (total allowable catch) was claimed as the recovery of the stock was observed according to the recovery plan adopted by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT) in 2006.

The case was brought to the Spanish Court through the regional Federation of Cofradias, whose role is to regulate and control the access to resources of the fleet’s operation within their territorial limits. However, the change of governance system (CFP 2013) decentralized the power of these organizations to the State. With control loss, Cofradias were forced to use lobbyists and NGOs as their representatives to gain insight and access to policy processes. The joint organizational efforts plus scientific evidence collected by academia increased the visibility and voice of Canary Islanders, resulting in the national regulation change. In 2018, the increase of the national Bluefin TAC accounted for 400 tons of fish compared to the 255 tons allowed in the previous year.

Conclusion

In cases like the Canary Islands, non-fish actors play an essential role in supporting the rights of vulnerable fishery sectors. For example, LIFE, an environmental NGO that mobilizes human resources to set agendas, and funding represent fishermen’s interest in policy-making.

Principle

Strengthens Legality and Governance

Legality and conformity to regulations in management areas are priorities to ensure resources are utilized sustainably. Application and conformity to governance systems in management areas ensures fishing rights are used and recorded. To ensure legality and governance, illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing should be prevented and deterred. Fishers should obtain legal rights and maintain its usage with others in accordance with the agreed governance system. Compliance to local, national and international regulations should be managed together with other fishers and policy makers. Multi-stakeholder and small-scale fishers participation in co-management governance plays a crucial role in allocating resources and safeguarding indigenous fishers' rights.